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MILLS v. HEALTH CARE SERVICE
CORPORATION: ARE 'BACKGROUND
CIRCUMSTANCES" TOO MUCH TO ASK OF
A PLAINTIFF ALLEGING REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT?
SUSAN C. THIES*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to
eradicate discrimination against persons on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin"' in employment
determinations. 2 Title VII protects members of any race, gender,
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., State
University of New York at Stony Brook.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). This section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
2 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)
(stating that Title VII requires that employers make employment decisions that are
not based on race, sex, or national origin); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (stating that "[tihe language of Title VII makes plain the
purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities"); Joyce A.
Hughes, 'Reverse Discrimination" and Higher Education Faculty, 3 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 395, 399 (1998) (stating that Title VII "seeks to eliminate discrimination in
employment opportunities"); Peter Gene Baroni, Case Note, Background
Circumstances: An Elevated Standard of Necessity in Reverse Discrimination Claims
Under Title VII, 39 HOW. L.J. 797, 797 (1996) (noting that Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating based on unlawful criteria); Brenda D. DiLuigi,
Note, The Notari Alternative: A Better Approach to the Square-Peg-Round-Hole
Problem Found in Reverse Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK L. REV. 353, 357 (1998)
("Title VII... established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC') and marked its task. to ensure that all individuals are given an
evenhanded opportunity for employment and promotion on the basis of ability and
qualification, without regard to race, color, sex, religion or national origin."); Tristin
Y, Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework:
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 983, 983 (1999) (stating that Title VII has "served as an important tool in
fighting discrimination in the workforce"); Janice C. Whiteside, Note, Title VII and
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religion, or national origin.3 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,4 a case involving discrimination against a black employee,
the United States Supreme Court set the standard for the
evaluation of disparate treatment employment discrimination
claims using circumstantial evidence. 5 As suits were commenced
Reverse Discrimination: The Prima Facie Case, 31 IND. L. REV. 413, 415 (1998)
(stating that "[in sum, McDonnell Douglas enunciates that the primary purpose of
Title VII is to assure neutral employment decisions"). Title VII provides "a federal
cause of action for victims of invidious discrimination in the workplace." DiLuigi,
supra, at 353. The protections afforded by Title VII extend to both individuals and
groups. See E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the
Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 447
(1998).
3 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976)
(holding that because the terms of Title VII are "not limited to discrimination
against members of any particular race," the Act applies to white plaintiffs in the
same manner as it applies to minority groups); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800
(noting that, in reference to Title VII, "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed" (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that "[wihites are also a
protected group under Title VII"); Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., No. 95-0157-B,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *18-20 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 1996) (applying Title VII
to a male plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination in employment); 45A AM. JUI. 2D
Job Discrimination § 130 (1993) ("The same standards that prohibit race
discrimination against nonwhites apply to whites."); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 357
(stating that "[a]lthough [Title VIrs] legislative history underscored the need to
provide increased employment opportunity to minority persons, the neutral
language of the statute reveals that the scope of Title VII was intended to reach
persons of all races, including non-minorities") (footnote omitted); Bridget E.
McKeever, Survey, Tenth Circuit Provides Alternative for Majority Plaintiffs to State
a Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Notari v. Denver Water Department, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 440, 440-41 (1993) (noting that "Title VI's protections... extend to members
of historically or socially favored groups").
4 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5 See id. at 802-04 (establishing the three-part framework for evaluating a
black male's employment discrimination claim under Title VII); see also Scott Black,
McDonnell Douglas' Prima Facie Case and the Non-Minority Plaintiff: Is
Modification Required?, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 309, 310 (1995) (delineating the
four elements required to make a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII
and the three-stage burden-shifting framework for evaluating Title VII employment
discrimination cases); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination:
Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK L. REV. 659, 659 (1998) (recognizing McDonnell
Douglas as establishing a "three-stage, burden-shifting framework for analyzing
employment discrimination cases"); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 353 (stating that
"McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, established a framework for determining the
existence of Title VII race-based employment discrimination on the basis of indirect
evidence") (footnote omitted); Green, supra note 2, at 986-88 (noting that
McDonnell Douglas established the three-stage "framework for the order and
allocation of proof in Title VII individual disparate treatment cases based on
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by non-minority plaintiffs, the federal courts split on the
framework that must be established by "majority 6 plaintiffs in
employment discrimination actions.7 Recently, in Mills v. Health
circumstantial evidence"); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 419 (stating that all but one
circuit has adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework in some form when
evaluating "reverse discrimination" cases). The Supreme Court and other courts
have since adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework in evaluating Title VII
employment discrimination claims brought by females, whites, and males. See
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 (adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework in evaluating
a Title VII claim brought by a female); McDonald, 427 U.S. at 281-84 (discussing
the three-part burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas in
reference to a white plaintiffs claim of employment discrimination); Harding v.
Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (adopting, with some adjustment, the
McDonnell Douglas test in evaluating a male plaintiffs Title VII claim).
The McDonnell Douglas framework is a three-part burden-shifting test. See
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05. The first part requires that the plaintiff
establish a four-prong prima facie case. See id. at 802. Once the plaintiff has made a
prima facie case, the second part requires that the defendant articulate non-
discriminatory reasons for the employment decision. See id. If the defendant does
articulate non-discriminatory reasons, the third part requires that the plaintiff
show that those reasons are merely a pretext for a racially discriminatory decision.
See id. at 804-05; see also infra Part I (providing an in-depth discussion of the
McDonnell Douglas framework).
6 The term "majority" refers to those plaintiffs who do not belong to historically
disfavored groups or minorities. The term thereby includes both males and white
persons. It does not, however, reflect the actual population numbers of any of these
groups. See ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1999).
7 See id. at 160-61. The ladimarco court rejected the "background
circumstances" test adopted by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and held that:
all that should be required to establish a prima facie case in the context of
"reverse discrimination" is for the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to
allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating some people
less favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title
VII.
Id.; see also Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454-56 (7th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the approaches taken by various federal courts in reverse discrimination
cases); Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 (requiring that in order to establish a prima facie
case, majority plaintiffs show "background circumstances [that] support the
suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against
the majority"); Carey, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *19 (requiring a male
plaintiff to set forth the traditional McDonnell Douglas prima facie case); Baroni,
supra note 2, at 797 (stating that some circuit courts have required that plaintiffs
alleging reverse discrimination establish a different element in their prima facie
case); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 354-55 (noting that application of the McDonnell
Douglas framework to reverse discrimination cases has been complex and has
resulted in conflicting views among circuit and district courts); Whiteside, supra
note 2, at 413 (noting that "[diespite the number of reverse discrimination claims,
the circuits have been unable to agree upon the requirements of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case for a reverse discrimination claim") (footnote omitted). The
reason for the disagreement among the courts is that the first element of the prima
facie case set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
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Care Service Corp.,8 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the "majority" plaintiff, Douglas Mills,
established a prima facie case of employment discrimination by
setting forth evidence of "background circumstances which give
rise to an inference of discrimination."9
Douglas M. Mills was employed by the defendant, Health
Care Service Corporation (HCSC).10 Mills began working at
HCSC in 1988.11 During his employment at HCSC's Quincy,
Illinois office, he held a variety of positions.12 Mills usually
received favorable employment reviews.13 In 1995, an assistant
manager position was created at the Quincy office after one of
the co-managers resigned.' 4 Mills and three women applied for
the position.15 The sole remaining manager in the Quincy office,
Linda Amburn, interviewed Mills and one of the women applying
for the position, Darlene Butler.16 The position was ultimately
offered to Butler.'7 After the decision was made, Mills brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District
of Illinois alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title
VII.18 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, concluding that Mills could not establish that
HCSC's articulated reasons for failing to promote him were
merely pretextual.19 The Seventh Circuit subsequently affirmed
the district court's decision employing a somewhat different
rationale. 20
requires that a plaintiff show membership in a minority group. See Iadimarco, 190
F.3d at 158. In a "reverse discrimination" case, the plaintiff necessarily cannot
establish membership in a minority group. See id.; DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 356
(describing reverse discrimination as the" 'square-peg-round-hole' problem").
8 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999).
9 Id. at 457. The "background circumstances" test requires that a reverse
discrimination plaintiff produce evidence that "support[s] the suspicion that the
defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."
Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017; see also infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text
(providing a detailed discussion of the "background circumstances" test).
10 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 453.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. The resigning co-manager was a female. See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 453-54.
20 See id. at 460.
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The circuit court began its analysis by discussing the two
ways in which a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment in favor
of a defendant in an employment discrimination action.21
Because Mills did not set forth direct evidence of employment
discrimination, the court analyzed his claim in terms of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, which is used when indirect
evidence is proffered.22  The court addressed the problem
encountered when a "majority" plaintiff attempts to present
indirect evidence of employment discrimination using the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The court discussed two of the
several ways in which the first element of the prima facie case
could be altered to fit a "reverse discrimination"24 claim.25 The
21 See id. at 454. One way in which a plaintiff may avoid summary judgment in
favor of a defendant is to "present direct evidence showing discriminatory intent by
the defendant or its agents." Id. Direct evidence "must be supported by allegations
which, 'if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question
without reliance upon inference or presumption.'" Id. (quoting Eiland v. Trinity
Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 1998)).
The second way in which a plaintiff may defeat a defendant's summary
judgment motion is to offer some form of indirect evidence of discrimination. See id.
Indirect evidence is generally presented in the form of the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. See id. An alternative way for a plaintiff to present
indirect evidence of discrimination, without using the McDonnell Douglas
framework, is to show "'indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable
probability... that but for [his] status [as a white male,] the challenged
employment decision' would not have occurred." Id. at 456 (alteration in original)
(quoting Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th Cir. 1997)).
22 See id. at 454-55. The court began its analysis of the plaintiffs claim using
the first part of the McDonnell Douglas framework. See id. The first part of the
framework requires the plaintiff to establish a four-prong prima facie case. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
23 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 454-55. In order to use the McDonnell Douglas
framework in a "reverse discrimination" action, the first prong of the prima facie
case, which requires the plaintiff to belong to a protected minority class or be a
female, must be altered. See id. at 454. The need to alter the first prong of the prima
facie case in "reverse discrimination" claims has resulted in several different
interpretations. See infra Part II.
24 In this context, the term "reverse discrimination" refers to discrimination
against a member of a "majority" group. The term has several definitions. See Philip
L. Fetzer, 'Reverse Discrimination: The Political Use of Language, 12 NAT'L BLACK
L.J. 212, 216 (1993) (describing six different definitions of the term "reverse
discrimination"); Hughes, supra note 2, at 404 (discussing the origin of the term in
relation to affirmative action); see also Baroni, supra note 2, at 797 n.4 (defining
"reverse discrimination" as a "Title VII discrimination claim by a majority
plaintiff'); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 354 n.12 (referring to the term and its definition
"as '[a] type of discrimination in which majority groups are purportedly
discriminated against in favor of minority groups'" (alteration in original) (quoting
BLACIVS LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (6th ed. 1990)); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 413 n.2
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court ultimately adopted the "background circumstances" test as
a replacement for the first prong of the prima facie case.26 The
court also discussed, but did not apply, an alternative method by
which a reverse discrimination plaintiff could use indirect
evidence to survive a summary judgment motion by a
defendant.27 The court concluded that Mills established a prima
(noting that the term "refers to discrimination against members of groups which
have not traditionally been subjected to discrimination, such as nonminorities and
males"). The term "reverse discrimination," however, has invoked much criticism.
See Fetzer, supra, at 212 (stating "that 'reverse discrimination' is a covert political
term which should be removed from the vocabulary of any serious academician or
lay-person"); Hughes, supra note 2, at 405 (noting that "politicizing Title VII by
reliance on the concept of 'reverse discrimination' is detrimental").
25 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 455-56. The first option the court addressed was to
drop the first prong of the prima facie case in actions involving "reverse
discrimination." See id. at 455. The court, however, went no further than a one-
sentence reference to this option. See id. The court then discussed an alternative
option adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit and the Tenth Circuit. See id.
This option is known as the "background circumstances" test. See id. The case most
often cited as the origin of the "background circumstances" test is Parker v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See Harding v.
Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585,
588-89 (10th Cir. 1992); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67
(6th Cir. 1985); Baroni, supra note 2, at 800-01; DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 361-62
(discussing Parker's creation of the "background circumstances" test).
The Mills court also referred to the test adopted by the Sixth Circuit, which is
similar to the "background circumstances" test. See Mills, 171 F.3d at 455 n.2
(discussing Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985),
and the Sixth Circuit's continued use of the Murray test even though it was
subjected to controversy within that circuit). The Murray test requires a reverse
discrimination plaintiff to satisfy the "background circumstances" test and show
"that the employer treated differently employees who were similarly situated but
not members of the protected group." Murray, 770 F.2d at 67. In Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth Circuit
criticized, but did not reject, the use of the "background circumstances" test in
reverse discrimination cases. See id. at 801 n.7 ("We have serious misgivings about
the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who
are white or male than for their non-white or female counterparts.").
26 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 456-57 (agreeing with the underlying rationale
employed by the circuits that already adopted the "background circumstances" test);
see also infra Parts II & III.
27 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 456. The court noted that a reverse discrimination
plaintiff who has failed to establish a prima facie case, in its modified form, may
nonetheless produce indirect evidence that" 'establish[es] a logical reason to believe
that the [employer's] decision rests on a legally forbidden ground.'" Id. at 456-57
(second alteration in original) (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d
157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). The court also cited with approval the
alternative approach adopted in Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Commission, 125 F.3d
1366 (10th Cir. 1997). See Mills, 171 F.3d at 456. The alternative allows reverse
discrimination plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case by producing evidence that
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facie case by showing, along with the other three elements of the
traditional formulation, sufficient "background circumstances
which give rise to an inference of discrimination" in order "to
overcome the background presumption that a white man was not
subject to employment discrimination."28 Having established the
requisite prima facie case, the court went on to review the other
two parts of the McDonnell Douglas framework.29
Under McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, the defendant must offer legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for the employment decision.3 0 HCSC
stated that Butler, the female candidate, had superior
qualifications as compared to Mills. 31 Some of the qualifications
emphasized by HCSC included Butler's computer science degree,
is "'sufficient to support a reasonable probability ... that but for [his] status [as a
white male] the challenged employment decision' would not have occurred." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Taken, 125 F.3d at 1369). The court in Taken
adopted this alternative test as it was set forth in Notari v. Denver Water
Department, 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992). See Taken, 125 F.3d at 1369.
The court in Notari adopted the alternative "but for" test in order to deal with
the potentially anomalous situation where a black plaintiff would be able to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination and a white plaintiff, subject to the
"background circumstances" test, would not be able to establish a prima facie case
using similar indirect evidence. See Notari, 971 F.2d at 589-90. The Notari court
stated that "[tlhe claims of two similarly situated victims of intentional
discrimination should not be subjected to such dissimilar dispositions." Id. at 590.
Several other circuits adopted a form of the "but for" test in reverse
discrimination cases. See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting that in order to establish a prima facie case, all that a "reverse
discrimination" plaintiff must show is "sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to
conclude that the employer is treating some people less favorably than others based
upon a trait that is protected under Title VI"); Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036-
37 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Notari in adopting this alternative test in an action
brought by a male plaintiff alleging gender discrimination); Ticali v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 41 F. Supp. 2d 249, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing a plaintiffs
reverse discrimination claim in terms of whether she produced direct or indirect
evidence "sufficient to support a finding that [she] was assigned to teach a different
class because of her religion, race or national origin").
28 Mills, 171 F.3d at 457. Evidence that HCSC disproportionately promoted
women during the seven years Mills was employed in the Quincy office was
considered appropriate background circumstances by the court. See id. (noting that
"[b]etween 1988-1995, nearly all promotions at the office went to women, and at the
time the challenged hiring decision was made, females dominated the supervisory
positions in the relevant office").
29 See id. at 457-60.
30 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
31 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 457-58.
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her greater breadth of experience, and her superior performance
on both oral and written interviews.32
In order to satisfy the third component of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
non-discriminatory reasons offered by the defendant are
pretextual.33 Mills produced evidence that some of the reasons
proffered by HCSC were possibly pretextual.34  The court
ultimately concluded, however, that Mills failed to prove that all
of the non-discriminatory reasons set forth by HCSC were in fact
pretextual.35
It is submitted that although the ultimate conclusion in
Mills is correct, the court improperly adopted the "background
circumstances" test in its evaluation of the plaintiffs prima facie
case. The adoption of the background circumstances test does
not mesh with the purposes of Title VII and McDonnell Douglas.
In addition, because the evidence necessary to make a showing of
background circumstances is vague, plaintiffs have a difficult
time knowing what they must allege and prove in order to make
out a prima facie case and survive a summary judgment motion.
Part I of this Comment will focus on McDonnell Douglas and
the creation of the three-part burden-shifting framework. Part
II will discuss reverse discrimination cases and the division
among the circuits regarding appropriate changes that need to
be made to the McDonnell Douglas standard for establishing a
prima facie case. Part III will analyze the "background
circumstances" test followed by some circuit and district courts,
including the court in Mills. Part IV will discuss the alteration
that should be made to the McDonnell Douglas framework in
order to resolve the reverse discrimination problem.
32 See id. at 458.
33 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. In order to defeat a summary
judgment motion by the defendant, the Mills court required that the plaintiff
"produce evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer" that the employer
lied about the reasons given for the employment decision. Mills, 171 F.3d at 458
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
34 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 459. The court did not find that Mills' evidence of the
falsity of HCSC's statement regarding the use of inquiry unit experience in its
decision-making process "created a genuine issue of material fact" as to pretext
because Mills did not show that all the reasons articulated by the defendant were
pretext. Id. at 459-60.
35 See id. at 459-60 (holding that "the plaintiff cannot show that the reasons
HCSC proffered for hiring Darlene Butler over him were pretextual").
544 [Vol.74:537
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I. TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN LIGHT OF
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. V. GREEN
The United States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,36 set forth the three-part framework courts use in
evaluating employment discrimination claims brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.37 In McDonnell
Douglas, a black plaintiff brought suit against his former
employer alleging racial discrimination.38  The defendant
employer terminated the plaintiffs employment in 1964.39 The
plaintiff, in response to his dismissal, joined a "stall-in" protest
planned by members of the Congress on Racial Equality.40 At
about the same time as the "stall-in," a "lock-in" took place at
one of the defendant's buildings.41 While it was unclear whether
the plaintiff had any knowledge of the "lock-in," he was not
arrested for any involvement in the event.42 After the "lock-in,"
the defendant employer began advertising for mechanics, the
same type of position the plaintiff once held at the corporation.43
36 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37 See id. at 802-05; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506
(1993) (recognizing McDonnell Douglas as the opinion that established the
framework for analyzing Title VII cases); Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 659
(stating "[uin 1973, the Supreme Court established the McDonnell Douglas test");
Hughes, supra note 2, at 401-02; Baroni, supra note 2, at 798 (stating that the
Supreme Court set forth the "framework governing a prima facie case of
employment discrimination and the allocation of the burdens of proof" in McDonnell
Douglas); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 353-54 (referring to the McDonnell Douglas case
as a "watershed" decision); Green, supra note 2, at 986 (referring to the three-part
framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 414-15.
38 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
39 See id. Prior to his dismissal, the defendant had employed the plaintiff
continuously for eight years, except for the plaintiffs twenty-one month military
service. See id. at 794 & n.1. The defendant was in the process of reducing its work
force when the plaintiff was dismissed. See id. at 794.
40 See id. The "stall-in" was in protest to the defendant's alleged racial
discrimination in employment decisions. See id. The protest involved the blockage of
the access roads to the defendant's plant during a shift change. See id. The police
broke up the protest shortly after it began and the plaintiff was arrested for his
participation in the event. See id. at 795. The plaintiff pleaded guilty to an
obstruction of traffic charge and received a fine. See id.
41 See id. The "lock-in" involved the padlocking of the front door of an office
building while certain employees of the defendant were still inside. See id.
42 See id. at 795 & n.3. Because the plaintiff had participated in the "stall-in,"
the Court chose not to resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff knew about and/or
participated in the "lock-in." See id.
43 See id. at 796.
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The plaintiff applied for a position but was allegedly rejected
because of his participation in both the "stall-in" and "lock-in."44
The plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
eventually led to an employment discrimination suit against the
corporation.45  When the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the dismissal of the case, it attempted to establish
rules to govern the burden of proof in employment
discrimination actions.4 6 The Supreme Court noted that the
resulting decision of the Eighth Circuit was split into several
opinions that failed to reflect a harmonious set of rules.47 The
Court granted certiorari "[i]n order to clarify the standards
governing the disposition of an action challenging employment
discrimination."48
The result of the Supreme Court's review of McDonnell
Douglas was the creation of a three-part burden-shifting
framework.49 The first part of the framework consists of the
four-prong prima facie case, which must be established by the
plaintiff.50 The first prong of the prima facie test requires the
plaintiff to assert "that he belongs to a racial minority."51 To
satisfy the second prong, the plaintiff must establish "that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants."52 The third prong requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate "that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected" for
the position.58 The fourth prong requires the plaintiff to show
44 See id.
45 See id. at 796-97.
4 See id. at 801.
47 See id. ("The two opinions of the Court of Appeals and the several opinions of
the three judges of that court attempted, with a notable lack of harmony, to state
the applicable rules as to burden of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a
prima facie case.").
48 Id. at 798. The Court held that the plaintiff should be given the opportunity,
in a new trial, to prove that the defendant's reasons for not re-hiring him were
pretextual. See id. at 807.
49 See id. at 802-04.
50 See id. at 802. The purpose of the prima facie case is to "eliminated the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection." Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). By establishing a prima
facie case, the plaintiff "creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employee." Id.
51 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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"that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications."54 These prongs, however, can be
adjusted to fit different factual situations in Title VII
employment discrimination actions.55
Once the plaintiff establishes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate non-discriminatory
reasons for the employment decision.56 If the defendant does not
54 Id.
65 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that "the prima facie proof required
from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situations." Id. at 802 n.13. Courts have altered the prongs of the prima facie case in
order to adapt the framework to the specific facts of the case. See Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 253 n.6 (changing the first prong of the prima facie case to a showing that the
plaintiff is a female); Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that "a plaintiff... should be able to establish a prima facie case... by presenting
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude (given the totality of
the circumstances) that the defendant treated plaintiff 'less favorably than others
because of [his or her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)));
Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(requiring reverse discrimination plaintiff to satisfy the background circumstances
test instead of the traditional first prong of the prima facie case); Carey v. Mt.
Desert Island Hosp., No. 95-0157-B, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *16-19 (D.
Me. 1996) (rejecting the heightened standard of background circumstances); Collins
v. School Dist., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1320-23 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that "because
plaintiff is male and is claiming that defendant unlawfully discriminated against
him on the basis of his sex, he has satisfied the first element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case of discrimination"); Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 663-
64 (discussing the various changes made to the prima facie case requirements since
the McDonnell Douglas decision); Baroni, supra note 2, at 799 (discussing changes
to the prima facie elements in a discriminatory promotion case); DiLuigi, supra note
2, at 359-60 (discussing several cases in which courts have adjusted the framework
to fit different types of employment discrimination claims).
56 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-
55 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework). The defendant carries the burden
of production at this stage, not the burden of persuasion. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (explaining that this presumption only shifts
the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, to the party who does not
bear the original burden of persuasion); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-58 (explaining
that the Court of Appeals improperly required the defendant to carry the burden of
persuasion, instead of the burden of production); Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at
664-65 (noting that the Burdine Court made it clear that the defendant bears the
burden of production); Baroni, supra note 2, at 799-800 (noting that "defendant's
burden is merely one of production"); Green, supra note 2, at 988. The burden of
persuasion always remains with the plaintiff. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56
(discussing the burdens of production and persuasion assigned to the parties); Chin
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set forth a non-discriminatory reason for the decision and the
evidence produced by the plaintiff in his or her prima facie case
is believed, the trier of fact must find for the plaintiff.57 If,
however, the defendant does articulate non-discriminatory
reasons for the employment decision, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff58 to show that the reasons proffered by. the
defendant are pretextual.59 The plaintiff must satisfy, the third
element of the framework in order to prevail in an employment
discrimination action.60
& Golinsky, supra note 5, at 664; Baroni, supra note 2, at 799-800; Green, supra
note 2, at 988.
57 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 & n.7. ("If the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must
enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.").
58 See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15 (noting that when the defendant provides a
non-discriminatory reason, the presumption of discrimination is dropped and the
inquiry proceeds to the ultimate question of whether the decision was in fact
discriminatory); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
59 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (noting that a plaintiff may succeed at this
stage if she demonstrates "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence"); McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (holding that a plaintiff must show "that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision"); Baroni, supra note 2, at 800 (stating that pretext may be
demonstrated using direct evidence; indirect evidence of disparate treatment of one
race or gender in comparison to other races or another gender; or statistical
evidence of disparate treatment of others of the same race or gender as the
plaintiff). The Supreme Court later refined the requirements of the pretextual
showing. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 418. The
Hicks Court held that the plaintiff must show the reasons offered by the defendant
were false and that the discrimination was the actual basis for the decision. See
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 & n.4; see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 418 (describing the
Hicks opinion as establishing a "pretext-plus" analysis). The Hicks decision
prompted a variety of interpretations and criticism among lower courts and legal
scholars. See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 666; Whiteside, supra note 2, at 418
n.34.
60 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (recognizing that "what is required to establish
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is infinitely less than what a directed
verdict demands"); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978)
(explaining that the Court of Appeals improperly equated the prima facie case with
a determination that an employer discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of
Title VII); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 418 (noting that in most cases, "the plaintiff
must present evidence beyond that required to establish a prima facie case").
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II. "REVERSE DISCRIMINATION" CASES AND THE SPLIT AMONG THE
CIRCUITS
The clash between the McDonnell Douglas framework and
suits alleging discrimination against a majority plaintiff caused
a division among the federal courts.6' In their attempts to adapt
the McDonnell Douglas holding to instances involving reverse
discrim ation, courts have modified the prima facie case in
several different ways.62 The modification adopted by the most
circuits is some form of the "background circumstances" test.63
61 See ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158-60 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the
different changes made to the McDonnell Douglas framework by many courts); Mills
v. Healthcare Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454-57 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing various
approaches to reverse discrimination cases taken by circuit and district courts);
Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 41 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); 45A
AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 130 (1993) (recognizing two different approaches
to "reverse discrimination" cases); Baroni, supra note 2, at 802-04 (noting that
"[tihere is an ongoing battle among the circuits over whether to follow Parker's
background circumstances test in reverse discrimination actions under Title VII");
DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 355 ("Circuit and district courts addressing this issue have
produced conflicting views"); McKeever, supra note 3, at 445 (noting that the Notari
court focused on the conflict between two approaches to the reverse discrimination
problem); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 419-20 (asserting that federal courts have not
agreed on the correct formulation for the prima facie case in reverse discrimination
claims).
62 See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 163 (stating that to establish a prima facie case,
"[t]he Title VH plaintiff needs only to present sufficient evidence to allow a fact
finder to conclude that the unexplained decision that forms the basis of the
allegation of discrimination was motivated by discriminatory animus"); Notari v.
Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that a reverse
discrimination plaintiff may either follow the "background circumstances" test or
produce "indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but
for the plaintiffs status the challenged employment decision would have favored the
plaintiff'); Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to cases of employment
discrimination against a white employee because "no presumption of discrimination
can be based on the mere fact that a white is passed over in favor of a black");
Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (requiring
that a reverse discrimination plaintiff satisfy the first prong of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case by showing "background circumstances [that] support the
suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against
the majority"); Collins v. School Dist., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1990)
(finding that because the plaintiff was male and claimed gender discrimination, the
first prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case had been met).
63 See Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 1997) (adopting the background
circumstances test and citing. the Notari opinion with approval); Murray v.
Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (adopting the
background circumstances test); Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017; Barnes v. Federal
Express Corp., No. CIV-A.95-CV-333-D-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9882, at *21 (N.D.
Miss. May 19, 1997) (holding that the background circumstances test "more
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Instead of establishing the first prong of the traditional
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish
"background circumstances [that] support the suspicion that the
defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against
the majority."64 This test is based on the assumption that most
employers discriminate against minorities and that the
promotion of a minority employee over a majority employee does
not raise an inference of discrimination.65
Two types of evidence can be used to satisfy the "background
circumstances" test.66 The first type is "evidence indicating that
the particular employer at issue has some reason or inclination
to discriminate invidiously against whites."6 7 The second type is
"evidence indicating that there is something 'fishy' about the
facts of the case at hand that raises an inference of
adequately encompasses the plethora of relevant facts that may give rise to such an
inference of discrimination"); Black, supra note 5, at 313; DiLuigi, supra note 2, at
365 (noting that the background circumstances test is "perhaps the most widely
accepted approach to reverse discrimination cases," even though it has been
attacked by other courts). The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have adopted both the
"background circumstances" as well as another test. See Mills 171 F.3d at 456-57;
Notari, 971 F.2d at 589-90. The second test requires the plaintiff to establish
"indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but for the
plaintiffs status the challenged employment decision would have favored the
plaintiff." Notari, 971 F.2d at 590.
64 Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017; see also Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
65 See Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 (noting that "it defies common sense to suggest
that the promotion of a black employee justifies an inference of prejudice against
white co-workers in our present society"); see also Baroni, supra note 2, at 808-09
(discussing the Harding court's holding and the various ways a majority plaintiff
can meet the heightened standard of proof in order to establish a prima facie case);
DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 362 (citing Parker and Harding to explain why the higher
standard of proof in reverse discrimination cases is required).
66 See Harding, 9 F.3d at 153 (discerning from prior cases two general
categories of evidence that are sufficient to establish "background circumstances");
Baroni, supra note 2, at 807-08; DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 363.
67 Harding, 9 F.3d at 153; see also Baroni, supra note 2, at 808 (discussing the
types of evidence that fit into this category); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 363. The
Harding court cited to several of its prior holdings that included evidence in this
category. See, e.g., Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786-87 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (involving evidence of minority supervisors combined with proposed
affirmative action plan); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(providing evidence of external pressure on hiring authority to increase percentage
of minorities in its employ as well as proposed affirmative action plan); Daye v.
Harris, 655 F.2d 258, 261 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (containing evidence that showed a
disproportionate amount of promotions going to nonwhite nurses).
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discrimination."68 Specific types of evidence found to satisfy the
background circumstances analysis have included: (1) superior
qualifications of the plaintiff;69 (2) "disproportionate hiring
patterns" favoring women over men;70 (3) an expression of an
interest in hiring a female by the person in charge of hiring;71
and (4) the fact that most supervisors and all employees in the
department are Hispanic and the plaintiff is white.72
68 Harding, 9 F.3d at 153; see also Baroni, supra note 2, at 808-09; DiLuigi,
supra note 2, at 363. The Harding court referred to cases it cited regarding the first
type of "background circumstances" evidence to show the types of evidence that fit
into the second category. See, e.g., Bishopp, 788 F.2d at 786-87 (promoting "in an
unprecedented fashion" a minority employee less qualified than four white
plaintiffs); Lanphear, 703 F.2d at 1315 (explaining how an overly qualified plaintiff
received "little or no consideration" for a position which was ultimately filled by a
minority applicant and how the hiring official failed to fully inquire into the
qualifications of the minority promotee); Daye, 655 F.2d at 260 (noting plaintiffs
allegation of a conspiracy that sought to rig performance ratings within the
"Hospital Merit Promotion Plan" ultimately resulting in the promotion of lesser
qualified minority nurses). The Harding court also noted that this second type of
evidence of "background circumstances" might establish, on its own, a prima facie
case of discrimination. See Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.
69 See Harding, 9 F.3d at 153-54. The Harding court reasoned that:
A rational employer can be expected to promote the more qualified
applicant over the less qualified, because it is in the employer's best
interest to do so. And when an employer acts contrary to his apparent best
interest in promoting a less-qualified minority applicant, it is more likely
than not that the employer acted out of a discriminatory motive.
Id.; see also Baroni, supra note 2, at 808-09; DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 363.
70 Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
plaintiff satisfied the "background circumstances" test by showing that at the
plaintiffs office almost all promotions were given to women, and that women held
most of the supervisory positions).
71 See Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1037 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that interest
in hiring a female, evidence of superior qualifications of the plaintiff, and evidence
of other female hires were all "background circumstances"). The Duffy court noted
that "Duffy [was] statutorily exempt from bringing a claim under Title VII." Id. at
1036 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994). Duffy, however, was able to bring a Bivens
action, which is "an inherent cause of action [recognized by the Supreme Court] for
damages against federal actors for violations of federal constitutional rights." Id. at
1033. In this case, the federal constitutional right alleged to be violated was "[tihe
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,"
which forbid[s] the federal government from discriminating on the basis of gender."
Although this was not a Title VII employment discrimination claim, the court still
applied the "background circumstances" test as a replacement for the first prong of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. See id. at 1036-37.
72 See Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that a white plaintiff satisfied the "background circumstances" test by
showing that she was the only non-Hispanic member of the Bilingual/ESOL
Department).
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A more recent approach has been to require the plaintiff to
"present[U sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to
conclude (given the totality of the circumstances) that the
defendant treated plaintiff 'less favorably than others because of
[his or her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,'" instead
of requiring a showing of "background circumstances."73 Other
courts have required plaintiffs to satisfy either the background
circumstances test or" 'establish U a logical reason to believe that
the [employer's] decision rests on a legally forbidden ground.' "74
A fourth approach to the situation is to substitute a showing
that the plaintiff is a member of a minority group for a showing
that the plaintiff is a member of a class.7 5 This test generally
requires that a reverse discrimination plaintiff show that he is
white, male, or both, depending on the type of discrimination
alleged, instead of membership in a racial minority, as is
required by the traditional prima facie case.76 A final approach
73 Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir. 1999) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 450 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
74 Mills, 171 F.3d at 456-57 (second alteration in original) (quoting Carson v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)) (adopting both
the background circumstances test and an alternative test and citing with approval
most of the Notari approach to the reverse discrimination problem); see also
Fucarino v. Thornton Oil Corp., No. 98-C1429, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609, at
*20-21 (N.D. 111. Aug. 23, 1999) (adopting the Mills standard). In Notari v. Denver
Water Department, 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992), the court adopted a similar
approach, allowing reverse discrimination plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case
either through the background circumstances test or by showing "indirect evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiffs status the
challenged employment decision would have favored the plaintiff." Id. at 590.
75 See Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring a reverse
discrimination plaintiff to prove membership in a class); Carey v. Mt. Desert Island
Hosp., No. 95-0157-B, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *19 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 1996)
(applying the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework to a suit alleging gender
discrimination and holding that the male plaintiff satisfied the test); Collins v.
School Dist., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (finding that the first prong
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was established because the plaintiff was
a male and alleged unlawful gender discrimination); DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 365-
66 (underscoring the Wilson court's apparent rejection of the "background
circumstances" test); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 426-27 (discussing the Collins
court's rejection of the "background circumstances" test in favor of requiring the
plaintiff simply to state class membership). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
eventually chose to adopt the "background circumstances" test in lieu of the
standard set forth in Collins in a Bivens employment discrimination case. See Duffy,
123 F.3d at 1037; see also supra note 71 (discussing Duffy's Bivens employment
discrimination action).
76 See Carey, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *14, 19 (observing that since the
first prong of a prima facie gender discrimination suit requires membership in a
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to the conflict is to reject altogether the McDonnell Douglas
framework when analyzing a reverse discrimination claim.77
This approach is based on the assumption that the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case was meant to assist minorities and
women only.78 Under this approach, the plaintiff in a reverse
discrimination action may not rely on a presumption of
discrimination solely because a minority candidate is chosen.7 9
III. THE "BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST IS A FAILURE
The court in Mills applied the "background circumstances"
test to the plaintiffs reverse discrimination case.8 0  The
"background circumstances" test, however, should not be used as
a replacement for the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case.81 First, the test improperly requires a reverse
discrimination plaintiff to make a greater showing at the prima
facie level than other plaintiffs who allege employment
discrimination under Title VII.8 2 By requiring a greater degree
protected class, the male plaintiff established that element); Collins, 727 F. Supp. at
1323 (stating that the plaintiff established the first prong of a prima facie case
because he was a male and alleged gender discrimination).
77 See Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
presumption of discrimination which arises when minorities and women make out a
prima facie case does not arise for white plaintiffs). But see Whiteside, supra note 2,
at 420 (criticizing the Ustrak court's decision to not apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework to a reverse discrimination action). The Seventh Circuit has since held
that the McDonnell Douglas framework does indeed apply, with some alteration, to
reverse discrimination claims. See Mills, 171 F.3d at 454-56.
78 See Ustrak, 781 F.2d at 577.
79 See id.
80 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 456-57 (adopting the "background circumstances" test,
which emanates from the presumption that "it is the unusual employer who
discriminates against majority employees").
81 See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the
"background circumstances" test); Carey, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *16-17
(holding that the "background circumstances" standard should not be adopted);
Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1322-23 (holding that reverse discrimination plaintiff need
not make a showing of background circumstances to establish a prima facie case);
see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 428 (submitting that a reverse discrimination
plaintiff should not have to show background circumstances).
82 See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 159 (discussing several cases that regard the
"background circumstances" approach as a heightened standard which should not
be required of reverse discrimination plaintiffs); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins.
Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994) ("We have serious misgivings about the
soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are
white or male than for their non-white or female counterparts."); Carey, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *15-19 (discussing "background circumstances" as a
heightened standard and holding that a heightened standard violates Title VIis
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of proof from some plaintiffs and not others, the "background
circumstances" test violates the intent of the neutral language in
Title VII.83
Second, the "background circumstances" test alters the
entire McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.8 4 The
test requires the reverse discrimination plaintiff to present
evidence that would usually be required of a plaintiff at the third
language); Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1321-22 (criticizing the "background
circumstances" test as requiring more of reverse discrimination plaintiffs at the
prima facie level of judicial inquiry); see also Black, supra note 5, at 313, 328
(asserting that any modification of the McDonnell Douglas analysis contravenes the
broad purpose behind Title VII and confounds the role of the prima facie case in
establishing employment discrimination claims); Baroni, supra note 2, at 816
(discussing the apparent contradiction in the Harding court's claim that background
circumstances do not require more of a reverse discrimination plaintiff when that
court specifically applied a different, more onerous burden to a majority plaintiff);
DiLuigi, supra note 2, at 370 (commenting that reverse discrimination plaintiffs
must bear a higher burden when the "background circumstances" formulation is
applied); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 429-30 (noting that background circumstances
require reverse discrimination plaintiffs to prove more at the prima facie stage). The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, held that the "background
circumstances" test is not a heightened standard for reverse discrimination
plaintiffs. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that the
"background circumstances" approach is not an "additional hurdle" for reverse
discrimination plaintiffs). The court in Mills suggested that eliminating the
"background circumstances" test would actually allow reverse discrimination
plaintiffs to prove less in order to make out a prima facie case. See Mills, 171 F.3d at
457.
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (listing "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" as protected classifications without limitations on the particular
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" of the individual); McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (stating that "Title VII...
proscribe[s] racial discrimination... against whites on the same terms as racial
discrimination against nonwhites"); ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161 (discussing prima
facie case requirements as applicable to all Title VII plaintiffs); Collins, 727 F.
Supp. at 1322 (emphasizing that legitimate Title VII claims are defeated by a
background circumstances requirement); see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 434
(arguing that since Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon protected
attributes, the "background circumstances" test should not be applied because it
treats plaintiffs differently based on those very attributes).
84 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (recognizing
that the prima facie showing is not tantamount to an ultimate finding of fact that
employment discrimination existed); ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161 (noting that
background circumstances "can undermine the basic point of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting regime"); Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1321 (stating that the
"background circumstances" standard "eliminates the McDonnell Douglas
framework from reverse discrimination cases"); Black, supra note 5, at 337 (stating
that the "background circumstances" test almost requires reverse discrimination
plaintiffs to demonstrate direct evidence of discrimination); Whiteside, supra note 2,
at 427.
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stage of the framework 8 5 By prematurely invoking the third
step, reverse discrimination plaintiffs must present evidence of
pretext before they get the benefit of forcing the defendant to
articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment
determination.86
The Supreme Court noted that "the method suggested in
McDonnell Douglas for pursuing [an employment discrimination]
inquiry . . . was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic."8 7 The Court appears to be referring to the changes
that are necessary to adapt the prima facie case to different
types of employment decisions.88 By adopting the background
85 See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161; Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1321; see also
Whiteside, supra note 2, at 430 (noting that types of evidence reviewed by the
Parker court in the background circumstances context were used by the McDonnell
Douglas Court in determining pretext).
86 See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 161 (noting that acceleration of the pretext
analysis to the prima facie step destroys one of the underlying motifs of the
framework, i.e., a gradual process of first removing some of the typical
nondiscriminatory reasons for employment decisions and then placing the burden
on the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
its decision); Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1321; see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 430
(maintaining that a "background circumstances" standard requires a "reverse
discrimination plaintiff [to] justify the presumption" that arises through the
showing of a prima facie case, something which is clearly not required of minority
plaintiffs).
87 Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 577. When it set down the elements of the
prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that "[t]he facts necessarily
will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification... of the prima facie proof
required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13
(1973). The Court, in discussing the elements of the prima facie case, further
articulated that "[requirement (i) of this sample pattern of proof was set out only to
demonstrate how the racial character of the discrimination could be established in
the most common sort of case, and not as an indication of any substantive limitation
of Title VIrs prohibition of racial discrimination." McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6.
This supports the reading of Title VII as proscribing all discrimination based on
race in the employment sector. It also implies that plaintiffs can present evidence of
racial discrimination in another manner, so long as the burden on plaintiffs is not
different. This reading is at odds with the "background circumstances" test because
that test requires reverse discrimination plaintiffs to bear a higher burden than
other plaintiffs. Another author has interpreted footnote six in McDonald in a
similar manner, concluding that the "background circumstances" test is not in
accord with Supreme Court precedent. See Whiteside, supra note 2, at 435-36. That
author, however, further concluded that in reverse discrimination cases, the first
element of the prima facie case should be changed from a statement of membership
in a racial minority to a statement of class membership. See id. But see infra Part IV
(discussing a better solution to the reverse discrimination problem).
88 See Whiteside, supra note 2, at 435. The changes in the elements of the
prima facie case that have been made in the past relate to different types of
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circumstances test, however, the court in Mills overstepped the
bounds provided by the United States Supreme Court. The Mills
court distorted the proof required of plaintiffs at the prima facie
level and made reverse discrimination plaintiffs put forth
evidence of the ultimate question of discrimination at the very
beginning of the case.
In addition, as the Court noted in discussing the burden-
shifting framework, employment discrimination is often difficult
to prove.89 The prima facie case was designed to assist plaintiffs,
rather than burden them.90 The "background circumstances"
test, however, performs just the opposite function by requiring a
reverse discrimination plaintiff to meet a higher standard of
proof at the prima facie level.91
Finally, the courts that have adopted the "background
circumstances" test have failed to clearly define or apply it.92
The test does not provide a clear standard for reverse
discrimination plaintiffs to follow when attempting to establish a
employment actions. See id. It is more likely that the Court was discussing these
types of changes to the prima facie case when it noted that changes would need to
be made in the prima facie elements to fit the facts of the case, not changes that
would alter the entire framework, as does the "background circumstances" test. See
id.
89 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983) ("All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in
discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult."); Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1321
(stressing that "[tihe McDonnell Douglas framework was.., a procedural
embodiment of the recognition that employment discrimination is difficult to prove
with only circumstantial evidence"); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 433 ("The purpose
of the prima facie case is to assist plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence of
discriminatory intent."). The Court also noted that in dealing with the difficult
problem of discriminatory intent, "[tihere will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to
the employer's mental processes."Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
90 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(noting that "[tihe burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment
is not onerous"); Whiteside, supra note 2, at 436 (noting that, in establishing a
prima facie case, the burden imposed upon the plaintiff is not "onerous" and the
factual showing is "minimal" in order "to allow the plaintiff to get past the summary
judgement stage of litigation").
91 See Black, supra note 5, at 336 (underscoring that the "background
circumstances" test adopted by the Parker court places a burden on the reverse
discrimination plaintiff 'that is nearly close to impossible to meet and one that
destroys the very purpose of the prima facie case").
92 See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that "the
concept of 'background circumstances' is irremediably vague and il-defined"); see
also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 431 (noting that "[tihe factual showing necessary to
meet the requirement of background circumstances is unclear; it changes with each
individual case and the individual judges deciding each case").
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prima facie case of reverse discrimination.93 Plaintiffs should
not be subjected to an undefined requirement in order to make
out a prima facie case.
In Mills, the court found that the plaintiff produced evidence
that was sufficient to satisfy the "background circumstances"
test.94 Other reverse discrimination plaintiffs, however, have not
been as successful in satisfying the "background circumstances"
test.95 The McDonnell Douglas framework was meant to guide
plaintiffs in order to sustain their case beyond summary
judgment.96 By requiring reverse discrimination plaintiffs to
satisfy the "background circumstances" test, plaintiffs are less
likely to defeat summary judgment motions than are other
employment discrimination plaintiffs. In addition, the higher
burden placed upon reverse discrimination plaintiffs defeats the
equitable purposes of Title VII.
93 See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161 (questioning whether the fact that the
plaintiff was more qualified than the person actually hired is a background
circumstance); see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 430-31 (noting the confusion
created by court decisions which hold that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
facts sufficient to satisfy the "background circumstances" test without identifying
facts that would be sufficient).
94 See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the facts presented by plaintiff were "enough to overcome the
background presumption that a white man was not subject to employment
discrimination").
95 See Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that because the reverse discrimination plaintiff failed to set forth
"background circumstances suggesting the defendants are the unusual employers
who discriminate against the majority," summary judgment in favor of the employer
was proper, without providing any indication of what evidence would be acceptable);
see also Whiteside, supra note 2, at 430-31 (discussing cases in which reverse
discrimination plaintiffs did not satisfy the background circumstances test and
demonstrating the lack of clarity regarding what facts are necessary to satisfy the
background circumstances test).
98 See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). The Trans
World Court stated that "(tihe shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell
Douglas are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the
unavailability of direct evidence.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)); see also Whiteside, supra note 2,
at 429 (noting that the Court, in Trans World, has articulated the purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas framework "as helping the plaintiff survive summary
judgement so that he or she has an opportunity to prove the case in court despite
the absence of direct evidence").
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IV. A BETTER SOLUTION TO THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
PROBLEM
When faced with a reverse discrimination plaintiff, courts
should abandon the "background circumstances" test as a
modification of the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in
favor of the approach taken by the court in Iadimarco v.
Runyon.97 In Jadimarco, the court concluded that when a
reverse discrimination plaintiff attempts to establish a prima
facie case with indirect evidence, the plaintiff must present
"sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude
(given the totality of the circumstances) that the defendant
treated plaintiff 'less favorably than others because of [his or
her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' "98 The
Iadimarco approach conforms to the purposes and requirements
of each stage of the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework
and avoids the problems associated with the "background
circumstances" test. Therefore, the ladimarco approach more
properly serves the equitable purposes of Title VII.
In ladimarco, the plaintiff, a white male, alleged reverse
discrimination in employment after his employer, the Postal
Service, failed to offer him a promotion.99  During a
reorganization of the Postal Service, many positions were
eliminated and managerial employees were asked to submit
their preferences for available managerial positions.10 0  As
requested, Iadimarco indicated his preference for three of the
available positions.101 White male employees filled two of the
three positions he listed.10 2 Among the remaining candidates for
the third position, only three were rated " 'superior' " in six
different " 'knowledge, skills and abilities'" categories used by
the Postal Service to evaluate employees.103  Two of the
candidates were placed in other jobs, leaving Iadimarco as the
only candidate for the position who received a rating of
97 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
98 Id. at 163 (alteration in original) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
99 See id. at 154.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 Id. The categories were related to management abilities, customer service,
and technical skills. See id. at 154 n.1.
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"superior" in all six categories. 104 Instead of automatically
promoting Iadimarco, his supervisor sought additional
applicants for the position.105 Shortly thereafter, ladimarco took
another job in the Postal Service. 106 A black female, Ms.
Williams, subsequently filled the position Iadimarco had
sought. 0 7
The court found that the evidence presented by Iadimarco
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of
shifting the burden pursuant to the framework outlined in
McDonnell Douglas.08 The court noted that, unlike Iadimarco,
Williams was not rated by the Postal Service. 109 Furthermore,
Williams had no experience in a comparable position.110 The
court also discussed the change in the job requirements after
Williams became a candidate for the position. Specifically, an
engineering degree, which Williams allegedly did not possess,
was no longer a requirement for the position."' The court stated
that this evidence must be viewed in light of a diversity memo
distributed by the supervisor who declined to promote
Iadimarco. 12 The court determined that, based on the evidence
presented by Iadimarco, the district court erred in finding that
Iadimarco failed to establish a prima facie case of "reverse
discrimination."" 3
104 See id. at 154.
105 See id. Iadimarco's supervisor testified that he sought additional applicants
because "he did not think that Iadimarco should be promoted by 'default.' "Id.
106 See id. at 155.
107 See id.
105 See id. at 164-65.
10 See id. at 164 (stating that the fact that Iadimarco's supervisor hired
Williams even though she was not rated by the Postal Service "certainly raises
suspicions").
110 See id. (noting that "Iadimarco had previously been In-Plant manager in
Trenton, and therefore had experience as an In-Plant manager [while] Williams did
not").
111 See id. (stating that it was unexplainable why the focus on engineering
backgrounds was subsequently abandoned).
112 See id. The memo discussed the importance of diversity in the workplace
and stated that management positions "should reflect the composition of our
workforce and communities if we are to benefit from the contributions that
minorities, women, and ethnic groups can bring to our decision making processes."
Id. at 155. The court noted that the memo itself did not establish a prima facie case
of reverse discrimination. See id. at 164. The court, however, was willing to give
greater weight to that evidence because when faced with a motion for summary
judgment, it must draw inferences of discrimination in favor of the plaintiff. See id.
113 See id. at 165.
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The court in Mills adopted a test to determine whether a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination that takes a middle approach and is similar to the
test adopted in Iadimarco.114 The middle approach adopted by
the court in Mills allows a reverse discrimination plaintiff to
make out a prima facie case by "'establish[ing] a logical reason
to believe that the [employer's] decision rests on a legally
forbidden ground.'"115 Both the Iadimarco approach and the
Mills alternative seem to broadly view the indirect evidence
presented to determine whether the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII, 116 instead of
requiring that the plaintiff fit his or her evidence into one of the
two categories of background circumstances. 117 The Mills court,
however, also adopted and subsequently applied the "background
circumstances" test to analyze the plaintiffs claim. 118
There is no need to apply a "background circumstances" test
once the middle approach is taken.119  The "background
circumstances" test attempts to fit a new standard into the first
prong of the prima facie case and requires a plaintiff to satisfy
the modified four prongs of the prima facie case. Instead of this
approach, a reverse discrimination plaintiff should be allowed to
focus directly on the issue of employment discrimination.120
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case "by presenting
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude
114 See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Co, 171 F.3d 450,457 (7th Cir. 1999).
115 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).
116 See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 163 (stating that "the totality of the
circumstances" should be reviewed to determine whether the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case); Mills, 171 F.3d at 457 (noting that the "background
circumstances" test "is not to be interpreted in a constricting fashion" and allowing
reverse discrimination plaintiffs to remove themselves from the restrictions of the
test by "'establish[ing] a logical reason to believe that the [employer's] decision
rests on a legally forbidden ground'" (second alteration in original) (quoting Carson,
82 F.3d at 159)).
117 For a discussion of the "background circumstances" test, see supra notes 63-
72 and accompanying text.
118 See Mills, 171 F.3d at 457.
11 See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161-62. The court noted that it is not necessary
to analyze whether a plaintiff has presented background circumstances when this
new approach is adopted. See id. at 162. In adopting both tests, some courts have
rendered the "background circumstances" test moot. See id. at 161.
120 See id. at 163 (noting that instead of running into problems trying to
"'cram[]' the 'background circumstances' inquiry into the first prong of McDonnell
Douglas," plaintiffs should follow a new test for establishing a prima facie case).
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(given the totality of the circumstances) that the defendant
treated plaintiff 'less favorably than others because of [his or
her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,'"121 the
traditional framework comes back into play.122
The ladimarco approach to determining whether a reverse
discrimination plaintiff established a claim is more appropriate
than the "background circumstances" test adopted in Mills.
First, this test may be applied to any type of employment
discrimination claim, not just reverse discrimination, without
requiring a heightened level of proof for any plaintiff.12 Second,
the test focuses the inquiry on the alleged discrimination against
the plaintiff, just as with the traditional prima facie case.124
Furthermore, this approach is not as rigid as the "background
circumstances" test. The test does not require plaintiffs to mold
their evidence into specific categories in order to establish a
prima facie case against the employer. Finally, the test does not
necessitate that plaintiffs show, at the prima facie level, that it
is the "unusual employer who discriminates against the
121 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978)).
mn See id. After holding that the plaintiff had presented a prima facie case
using this new method, the court then went on to review the second and third steps
in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id. at 165-67.
123 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set down a similar test in a case
involving racial discrimination against a black man. See Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794
F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1986). The court required that the plaintiff, who alleged
disparate treatment, either present
direct evidence of discrimination or by indirect evidence whose cumulative
probative force, apart from the presumption's operation, would suffice
under the controlling standard to support as a reasonable probability the
inference that but for the plaintiffs race he would have been promoted.
Without such evidence, the claimant must resort to the McDonnell Douglas
presumption with all of its ensuing complexities.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). The court in Notari v. Denver Water Department,
971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992), adopted the Holmes test as an alternative to the
"background circumstances" test. See McKeever, supra note 3, at 446-47. The Mills
court adopted, but did not apply, an alternative to the "background circumstances"
test that is similar to the Holmes/Notari approach. See Mills, 171 F.3d at 457
(noting that reverse discrimination plaintiffs may make out a prima facie case by
"'establish[ing] a logical reason to believe that the [employer's] decision rests on a
legally forbidden ground'" (second alteration in original) (quoting Carson v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996))).
14 See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 (noting that the focus of the prima facie case is
"whether the employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin' "). The test for reverse
discrimination plaintiffs focuses on the same inquiry at the prima facie level. See
ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 163.
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majority."125 To require such proof at the prima facie level
creates another hurdle for reverse discrimination plaintiffs,
which is contrary to Title VII and United States Supreme Court
precedent.
CONCLUSION
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set forth the
three-part framework used to analyze employment
discrimination claims brought under Title VII. This framework
includes a requirement that the plaintiff establish membership
in a racial minority. When majority plaintiffs began to bring
reverse discrimination actions, the federal courts split on how to
alter the McDonnell Douglas framework. A majority of the
courts adopted the "background circumstances" test to deal with
the reverse discrimination problem.
The Mills court erred in adopting the "background
circumstances" test as a resolution to the reverse discrimination
problem. The "background circumstances" test improperly
places a higher burden on reverse discrimination plaintiffs than
is required at the prima facie level of the traditional McDonnell
Douglas framework. By placing a higher burden on reverse
discrimination plaintiffs at this level, the test undermines the
underlying purposes of the prima facie case and the burden-
shifting framework- Additionally, this heightened burden
violates the intent behind the neutral language in Title VII.
A better solution of the reverse discrimination problem is to
require reverse discrimination plaintiffs to present "sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude (given the
totality of the circumstances) that the defendant treated plaintiff
5 Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The court in Mills agreed with this presumption. See Mills, 171 F.3d at 456-57. The
Collins court attacked the use of such a presumption in a Title VII analysis, stating
that "[tihe Parker requirement only protects the 'unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority;' employers who do not make employment
decisions based on impermissible factors are already adequately protected from
frivolous claims by the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework." Collins v. School
Dist., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 (W.D. Mo. 1990). The court in Iadimarco also
attacked the requirement that plaintiffs establish this presumption at the prima
facie level. See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 161 (noting that such a showing would more
likely be relevant as evidence in the pretext stage of the framework). The Parker
court's presumption, if ever proper, is no longer valid. See Black, supra note 5, at
350-51 (noting that "[tihe assumption that an employer generally does not
discriminate against majority class members is therefore no longer valid").
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'less favorably than others because of [his or her] race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin' " to establish a prima facie
case.126 This approach does not require a reverse discrimination
plaintiff to prove more than is required by the traditional
McDonnell Douglas test. Also, by not requiring more of reverse
discrimination plaintiffs, the neutral language of Title VII is not
violated.
Resolution of this problem is essential in order for reverse
discrimination plaintiffs to determine the types of evidence that
must be produced to succeed in employment discrimination
actions. Until the Supreme Court addresses the subject, courts
should adopt a test for reverse discrimination plaintiffs that does
not discriminate by eliminating the benefits of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework.
'
26Iadinarco, 190 F.3d at 163.
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